国際情勢評議会

Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.

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On the proliferation side, North Korea has sold ballistic missiles and associated materials to several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and, in our assessment, assisted Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor. We remain concerned North Korea could again export nuclear technology. In the October 3 Second Phase Actions agreement, the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. We assess Pyongyang is less likely to risk selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state actors, in part because it needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. Pyongyang probably also perceives that it would risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States if the nuclear material was used by another country or group in a nuclear strike or terrorist attacks and the United States could trace the material back to North Korea. It is possible, however, that the North might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material transfer more appealing if its own stockpile grows larger and/or it faces an extreme economic crisis where the potentially huge revenue from such a sale could help the country survive.

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Beyond its WMD potential, Iranian conventional military power threatens Persian Gulf states and challenges US interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries. It seeks a capacity to disrupt the operations and reinforcement of US forces based in the region, potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding support for US policy, and raising the political, financial, and human costs to the United States and our allies of our presence.

・ Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles―it already has the largest inventory in the Middle East―and its acquisition of anti-ship cruise missiles provide capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter and if necessary retaliate against forces in the region, including US forces. Its ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD and if so armed would fit into this same strategy.

一般に、費用対効果の面で弾道ミサイルがミサイル防衛を大きく上回っているために、ミサイル防衛の配備は、単に弾道ミサイルの増強を招くだけに終わりかねないと言われている。しかしながら、こうした可能性は、経済規模や技術に大差のない国家間の弾道ミサイル／ミサイル防衛競争に当てはまるものであり、米国と「ならず者国家」のように、経済・技術力に大きな差異がある国家の間では必ずしも当てはまらない。したがって、「ならず者国家」がグロ−バルに展開された米国のミサイル防衛やそうした防衛網によって高まった米国の地域紛争介入能力をみて、弾道ミサイルや核兵器の開発を断念することは十分に想定されるのである。

引用元：小川伸一「ミサイル防衛の戦略的意義と国際安全保障に与える影響」『防衛研究所紀要』第6巻第1号、2003年、14ページ。